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Abstract
In this paper we present a generalization of belief functions over fuzzy events. In particular
we focus on belief functions defined in the algebraic framework of finite MV-algebras of fuzzy sets.
We introduce a fuzzy modal logic to formalize reasoning with belief functions on many-valued
events. We prove, among other results, that several different notions of belief functions can be
characterized in a quite uniform way, just by slightly modifying the complete axiomatization of
one of the modal logics involved in the definition of our formalism.
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1. Introduction and motivation
Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence [8, 33] is a generalization of Bayesian probability theory in
which degrees of uncertainty are evaluated by belief functions, rather than by probability measures.
Belief functions [33, 34] can be regarded as a special class of measures of uncertainty on Boolean
algebras of events representing an agent’s degree of confidence in the occurrence of some event by
taking into account different bodies of evidence that support that belief [33]. Such evidence plays
a pivotal role in determining the agent’s belief. Indeed, as we will recall in a while, although any
belief function on the Boolean algebra 2X of subsets of a finite set X might be seen as a particular
probability, its associated distribution (called mass in Dempster-Shafer theory) maps the whole
algebra 2X into [0, 1], and not only its atoms. Every set Y ⊆ X with a strictly positive mass
represents a body of evidence and is called a focal element.
In the literature several attempts to extend belief functions on fuzzy events can be found.
The first extension of Dempster-Shafer theory to the general framework of fuzzy set theory was
proposed by Zadeh in the context of information granularity and possibility theory [37] in the form
of an expected conditional necessity. After Zadeh, several further generalizations were proposed
depending on the way a measure of inclusion among fuzzy sets is used to define the belief functions
of fuzzy events based on fuzzy evidence. Indeed, given a mass assignment m for the bodies of
evidence {A1, A2, . . .}, and a measure I(A ⊆ B) of inclusion among fuzzy sets, the belief of a fuzzy
IThis article is a revised and significantly extended version of the paper [15] appearing in the proceedings of
ECSQARU 2011.
Email address: {tommaso,godo,enrico}@iiia.csic.es (Tommaso Flaminio, Llu´ıs Godo and Enrico Marchioni)
Preprint submitted to International Journal of Approximate Reasoning January 2, 2012
set B can be defined in general by the value: Bel(B) =
∑
i I(Ai ⊆ B) · m(Ai). We refer the
reader to [24, 35] for exhaustive surveys, and [1] for another approach through fuzzy subsethood.
Different definitions were also introduced by Dubois and Prade [11] and by Denœux [9, 10] to deal
with belief functions ranging over intervals or fuzzy numbers.
Recently, in [26, 27] and in [15], the authors introduce a treatment of belief functions on
fuzzy sets within the algebraic framework of MV-algebras. We will recall the main ideas of these
approaches in Section 4, but it is worth pointing out that the choice of MV-algebras as a setting
for that investigation will play a notable role in the development of the present work. In fact here
we will focus our attention on the introduction of a multimodal logic for belief functions on fuzzy
sets, and, since MV-algebras are the equivalent algebraic semantics for  Lukasiewicz calculus, the
latter can be used both as ground logic to treat fuzzy events and as setting to axiomatize belief
functions over them as well.
The idea of formalising a logical system to reason with belief functions within the framework
of  Lukasiewicz logic is not new. In fact, a logic to reason with classical belief functions over  Luka-
siewicz logic was defined in [17] as a fuzzy probabilistic extension of the classical S5 modal logic.
The approach is based on exploiting the fact that a belief function on classical logic formulas ϕ
can be interpreted as a probability on modal formulas ϕ, and hence, in that setting, a formula
of the kind Pϕ, where P is a fuzzy modality for probability, can be read as ϕ is believable and
its semantics given by belief functions.
The treatment we propose here can be considered as an extension and a generalization of [17]. In
particular we will focus on representing belief functions defined over fuzzy sets of finite range, that
is, fuzzy sets on a finite set X and with membership values on a finite subset Sk = {0, 1/k, . . . , (k−
1)/k, 1} of the real unit interval [0, 1]. As we will recall later, every finite MV-algebra can be easily
represented as a subalgebra of fuzzy sets of the form (Sk)
X = {f | f : X → Sk}, for some natural
k. Then, a probabilistic modality P will be introduced into a suitable modal logic Λk over the
(k + 1)-valued  Lukasiewicz logic  Lk, and we will define the belief degree of a fuzzy event modeled
by a  Lk formula ψ as the probability of ψ, i.e. as the truth degree of Pψ.
It is worth noticing that there is not a unique way to generalize belief functions on MV-algebras.
In fact, we can distinguish at least the cases in which the belief functions are such that their focal
elements are (1) crisp sets, (2) fuzzy sets, and (3) normalized fuzzy sets. Remarkably, all these cases
can be uniformly treated in our multimodal setting only by distinguishing among several axiomatic
extensions of the intermediate modal logic Λk. We will discuss these topics in the subsections 6.1
and 6.2.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we will recall the basic notions about classical
belief functions, while Section 3 is devoted to preliminaries on finitely and infinitely-valued  Lu-
kasiewicz logics, MV-algebras and states. Then in Section 4 we will introduce belief functions on
MV-algebras and we will prove some basic properties. In Section 5 we consider another equivalent
approach to define belief functions on MV-algebras based on a generalization of Dempster’s spaces.
Section 6 will be devoted to the modal expansion Λk of  L
c
k, the (k + 1)-valued  Lukasiewicz logic
 Lk with truth constants, proving results concerning local finiteness and completeness. Moreover,
in Subsections 6.1 and 6.2, we will introduce two relevant axiomatic extensions of Λk that will
be used to characterize distinguished classes of belief functions. In Section 7 we finally introduce
the probabilistic logic over Λk, FP (Λk,  L
c), a class of probabilistic-based models, and we prove
completeness. Subsection 7.1 will focus on completeness of the logic FP (Λk,  L
c) with respect to
the semantics defined by belief function-based models, while in Subsection 7.2 we will introduce an
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extension of FP (Λk,  L
c) to deal with normalized belief functions. We end with Section 8, where
we discuss our future work.
2. Preliminaries on Belief functions on Boolean algebras
Consider a finite set X whose elements can be regarded as mutually exclusive (and exhaustive)
propositions of interest, and whose powerset 2X represents all such propositions. The set X is
usually called the frame of discernment, and every element x ∈ X represents the lowest level of
discernible information we can deal with.
A map m : 2X → [0, 1] is said to be a basic belief assignment, or a mass assignment whenever
m(∅) = 0 and
∑
A∈2X
m(A) = 1.
Given such a mass assignment m on 2X , for every A ∈ 2X , the belief of A is defined as
bm(A) =
∑
B⊆A
m(B). (1)
Every mass assignment m on 2X is in fact a probability distribution on 2X that naturally induces
a probability measure Pm on 2
2X . Consequently, the belief function bm defined from m can be
equivalently described as follows: for every A ∈ 2X ,
bm(A) = Pm({B ∈ 2X : B ⊆ A}). (2)
Therefore, identifying the set {B ∈ 2X : B ⊆ A} with its characteristic function on 22X defined by
βA : B ∈ 2X 7→
{
1 if B ⊆ A
0 otherwise,
(3)
it is easy to see that, for every A ∈ 2X , and for every mass assignment m : 2X → [0, 1], we have
bm(A) = Pm(βA). This easy characterization will be important when we discuss the extensions
of belief functions on MV-algebras. The following is a trivial observation about the map βA that
can be useful to understand our generalization: for every A ∈ 2X , βA can be regarded as a map
evaluating the (strict) inclusion of B into A, for every subset B of X.
A subset A of X such that m(A) > 0 is said to be a focal element. Every belief function is
characterized by the value that m takes over its focal elements, and therefore, the focal elements
of a belief function bm contain the pieces of evidence that characterize bm itself. For every set X
and for every mass assignment m, call Fm the set of focal elements of 2
X with respect to m. It is
well known that several subclasses of belief functions can be characterized just by the structure of
their focal elements. In particular, when Fm ⊆ {{x} : x ∈ X}, it is clear that bm is a probability
measure. Moreover, if the focal elements are nested subsets of X, i.e. Fm is a chain with respect
to the inclusion relation between sets, then bm is a necessity measure [11, 33]; this means e.g. that
bm(A1 ∩A2) = min{bm(A1),bm(A2)}.
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3. Preliminaries on  Lukasiewicz logic, MV-algebras and states
The logical setting in which we frame our study is that of (infinitely-valued)  Lukasiewicz logic
 L, and its finitely-valued schematic extensions  Lk. Formulas of (any finitely-valued)  Lukasiewicz
logic are inductively defined from a countable set V = {p1, p2, . . .} of variables, along with the
binary connective → and the unary connective ¬. We will denote by F(V ) the class of formulas
defined from the set of variables V .
Further connectives are definable from → and ¬ as follows:
ϕ⊕ ψ is ¬ϕ→ ψ
ϕ ψ is ¬(¬ϕ⊕ ¬ψ)
ϕ ∨ ψ is (ϕ→ ψ)→ ψ
ϕ ∧ ψ is ¬(¬ϕ ∨ ¬ψ)
ϕ↔ ψ is (ϕ→ ψ) ∧ (ψ → ϕ)
The truth constant > is ϕ → ϕ and the truth constant ⊥ is ¬>, and we will henceforth use the
following abbreviations: for every n ∈ N and for every ϕ ∈ F(V ), nϕ will stand for ϕ ⊕ . . . ⊕ ϕ
(n-times), and ϕn will stand for ϕ . . . ϕ (n-times).
The propositional  Lukasiewicz logic ( L in symbols) is defined as the following Hilbert style
system of axioms and rules (cf. [21]):
( L1) ϕ→ (ψ → ϕ),
( L2) (ϕ→ ψ)→ ((ψ → χ)→ (ϕ→ χ)),
( L3) (¬ϕ→ ¬ψ)→ (ψ → ϕ),
( L4) (ϕ ∨ ψ)→ (ψ ∨ ϕ),
(MP) The rule of modus ponens: from ϕ and ϕ→ ψ, deduce ψ.
For every k ∈ N, the (k+1)-valued  Lukasiewicz logic  Lk is the axiomatic extension of  L defined
by the following axioms (cf. [19, 21]):
( L5) (k − 1)ϕ↔ kϕ,
( L6) (lϕl−1)k ↔ kϕl, for every l = 2, . . . , k − 2 that does not divide k − 1.
The notion of deduction and proof are the usual ones (see [21]). A theory is any subset of F(V ),
and for every theory Γ and for every formula ϕ we will write Γ ` ϕ if ϕ can be proved from Γ in
the logic  Lk.
The algebraic counterpart of (finitely-valued)  Lukasiewicz calculus is the class of (finitely-
valued) MV-algebras. An MV-algebra (cf. [7, 21, 30]) is a system M = (M,⊕,¬, 0M ) of type
(2, 1, 0) such that the reduct (M,⊕, 0M ) is a commutative monoid, and the following equations
hold:
(MV1) x⊕ ¬0M = ¬0M ,
(MV2) ¬¬x = x,
(MV3) ¬(¬x⊕ y)⊕ y = ¬(¬y ⊕ x)⊕ x.
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For every k ∈ N, an MVk-algebra is any MV-algebra that also satisfies:
(MV4) kx = (k − 1)x,
(MV5) (lxl−1)k = kxl, for every l = 2, . . . , k − 2 that does not divide k − 1,
where, in (MV4) and (MV5), 1M stands for ¬0M , and for every n ∈ N, nx = x⊕ . . .⊕x (n-times),
and xn = x  . . .  x (n-times). As in the case of the logical language, here other operations can
also be defined, among them x→ y is ¬x⊕ y and x y is ¬(¬x⊕ ¬y).
In every MV-algebra M we can define an order relation by the following stipulation: for every
x, y ∈M ,
x ≤ y iff ¬x⊕ y = 1.
An MV-algebra is said to be linearly ordered, or an MV-chain, provided that the order ≤ is linear.
An evaluation e of formulas of F(V ) into an MV-algebra (MVk-algebra) M is any map e : V →
M that extends to compound formulas by truth functionality using the operations in M . We say
that e is a model of (or satisfies) a formula ϕ ∈ F(V ) when e(ϕ) = 1M . The class of MV-algebras
constitutes a variety (i.e. an equational class [3]), and MV-algebras are the equivalent algebraic
semantics for  Lukasiewicz logic. Similarly, for every k, MVk-algebras form a variety that is the
equivalent algebraic semantics for  Lk. Therefore  Lukasiewicz logic is complete with respect to the
class of MV-algebras, and  Lk is complete with respect to class of MVk-algebras.
Example 3.1 (Standard Algebras). (1) Equip the real unit interval [0, 1] with the operations of
- truncated sum: for all x, y ∈ [0, 1], x⊕ y = min(1, x+ y),
- standard negation: for all x ∈ [0, 1], ¬x = 1− x.
Then the algebra [0, 1]MV = ([0, 1],⊕,¬, 0) is an MV-algebra called the standard MV-algebra. The
variety of MV-algebras is generated, as a variety and as a quasi-variety, by [0, 1]MV (cf. [4, 7]).
This means that, in order to show that a given equality, or quasi-equality, written in the algebraic
language of MV-algebras, holds in every MV-algebra, it is sufficient to check whether it holds in
[0, 1]MV.
(2) For every k ∈ N let Sk = {0, 1/k, . . . , (k − 1)/k, 1}. Equip Sk with the restrictions to Sk
of the above defined truncated sum and standard negation. We will henceforth denote by Sk the
obtained structure, that is usually called the standard MVk-algebra. The variety of MVk-algebras
is generated by Sk (cf. [7]).
Clearly, the above examples (and the results cited therein) show a stronger version of complete-
ness for  L and  Lk that we are going to make clear as follows.
Theorem 3.2. (1)  Lukasiewicz logic has the finite strong real completeness (FSRC for short), i.e.:
for every finite theory Γ ⊆ F(V ), and for every formula ϕ, Γ ` ϕ in  L iff every evaluation into the
MV-algebra [0, 1]MV that satisfies Γ, satisfies ϕ as well.
(2) For every k ∈ N,  Lk has the strong real completeness (SRC for short), i.e.: for every theory
Γ ⊆ F(V ), and for every formula ϕ, Γ ` ϕ in  Lk iff every evaluation into the MVk-algebra Sk that
satisfies Γ, satisfies ϕ as well.
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Every MV-algebra M contains a largest Boolean algebra B(M) called the Boolean skeleton
of M , which is constituted by all the idempotent elements of M . Indeed, the universe of B(M)
coincides with the set {x ∈M : x x = x}.
Remark 3.3. It is worth noticing that every finite MV-algebra M can be represented as a finite
direct product of finite MV-chains. In other words, for every finite MV-algebra M , there exists a
finite MV-chain Sk, and a finite index set X such that M embeds into the direct product Sk)
X .
This means that every finite MV-algebra can be seen as a MV-subalgebra of functions from X into
Sk, i.e. as a MV-algebra of Sk-valued fuzzy sets of X. Therefore, without loss of generality, we will
henceforth concentrate on finite MV-algebras of fuzzy sets of this form.
3.1. Expanding  Lukasiewicz logic with rational truth constants
Let L denote either  L or  Lk, and let Q(L) denote the set of all the rational numbers included
into the standard algebra of L (recall Example 3.1). Therefore, if L stands for  L then Q( L) stands
for [0, 1]∩Q, while if L stands for any (k+1)-valued  Lukasiewicz logic  Lk, then clearly Q( Lk) = Sk.
The logic Lc is obtained by expanding the language of  Lukasiewicz logic by means of symbols
r for each r ∈ Q(L),1 and adding the following bookkeeping axiom schemes:
(Q1) (r1 → r2)↔ min{1, 1− r1 + r2};
(Q2) ¬r ↔ 1− r.
The algebraic counterpart of  Lc, are structures (M, {rM}r∈Q( L)) where M is an MV-algebra, the
rM ’s are nullary operations in M , and for every r, r1, r2 ∈ Q( L) the following hold:
r1
M → r2M = min(1, 1− r1 + r2)M
¬rM = 1− rM
We will henceforth omit the superscript M whenever it will be superfluous.
The standard  Lc-chain is the structure [0, 1] Lc = ([0, 1]MV , {r}r∈Q), i.e. the standard MV-chain
together with the rational truth constants r interpreted as themselves. For every k ∈ N,  Lck-algebras
and the standard  Lck-chain are defined in analogous way.
The notion of evaluation of F(V )c-formulas into expanded MV-structures with truth constants
is defined in the natural way. In particular, an Lc-evaluation on the standard Lc-chain is such that
e(r) = r for every r ∈ Q(L).
Theorem 3.4 ([13]). (1) The logic  Lc logic is finitely strong real complete, i.e. for every finite
theory Γ ⊆ F(V )c and for every formula ϕ in F(V )c, Γ ` ϕ in  Lc iff for every evaluation e into
the standard  Lc-chain such that e(γ) = 1 for every γ ∈ Γ, then e(ϕ) = 1 as well.
(2) For every k ∈ N, the logic  Lck is strong real complete, i.e. for every theory Γ ⊆ F(V )c, and
for every formula ϕ in F(V )c, Γ ` ϕ in  Lck iff for every evaluation e into the standard  Lck-chain
such that e(γ) = 1 for every γ ∈ Γ it holds that e(ϕ) = 1 as well.
1We will henceforth denote by F(V )c the class of formulas obtained from this expanded language.
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3.2. States on MV-algebras
The notion of state on an MV-algebra generalizes that of a finitely additive probability on a
Boolean algebra. More specifically, by a state on an MV-algebra M (cf. [29]) we mean a map from
M into the real unit interval [0, 1], s : M → [0, 1], satisfying:
(S1) s(1M ) = 1,
(S2) For every x, y ∈M such that x y = 0M , s(x⊕ y) = s(x) + s(y).
It can be easily shown that every state s on M satisfies s(¬x) = 1− s(x), and hence in particular
s(0M ) = 0.
Remark 3.5. The notion of state easily extends to expanded MV-algebras with truth constants,
just by requiring the same two properties (S1) and (S2). Namely, if M c = (M, {r}r∈Q(L)) is any
Lc-algebra, then (S1) and (S2) enforce every state s on M c to satisfy s(r) = r for every rational
r ∈ Q(L), and hence states on MV-algebras with truth constants are homogeneous. Therefore, this
enables us to concentrate on states on MV-algebras, regardless of the fact that the languages are
enriched by rational truth constants.
A state s on M is said to be faithful provided that s(x) = 0, implies x = 0M . In other words,
a state of M is faithful if the unique element of M sent to 0 is the bottom element of M .
Example 3.6. Consider any MV-algebra M . Then, every homomorphism h : M → [0, 1]MV is
a state. In addition, since the class St(M) of all the states of M is a convex subset of [0, 1]M
(cf. [29]), the homomorphisms of M into [0, 1]MV coincide with the extremal points of St(M), and
therefore by Krein-Mil’man theorem [18, Theorem 5.17] every state can be represented as a limit
of convex combinations of homomorphisms from M into [0, 1]MV (cf. [29, Theorem 2.5]).
Given a state s : M → [0, 1], we denote by Supp(s) its support, i.e. Supp(s) = {x ∈M : s(x) >
0}. The following theorem is an immediate consequence of [25, Corollary 29].
Theorem 3.7. Let M = (Sk)
X be a finite MV-algebra. Then for every state s : M → [0, 1] there
exists a finitely additive probability measure P on B(M) = 2X such that for every f ∈M ,
s(f) =
∑
x∈X
f(x) · P ({x}).
4. Belief functions on MV-algebras
In [26, 27], Kroupa provides a generalization of belief functions that can be easily adapted to the
framework of finite MV-algebras. Recalling Remark 3.3, we can assume that the finite MV-algebra
we are going to work with is M = (Sk)
X for a suitable MV-chain Sk, and a finite set X. Denote
by 2X the powerset of X, and consider, for every a : X → Sk the map ρˆa : 2X → Sk defined as
follows: for every B ⊆ X,
ρˆa(B) = min{a(x) : x ∈ B}. (4)
Remark 4.1. (1) ρˆa generalizes βA in the following sense: whenever A ∈ B(M) = 2X , then
ρˆA = βA. Namely, for every A ∈ B(M), ρˆA(B) = 1 if B ⊆ A, and ρˆA(B) = 0 otherwise.
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(2) If the finite MV-algebra we are dealing with coincides with the free n-generated MVk-algebra
LV0( Lk) (i.e. the Lindenbaum-Tarski MVk-algebra generated from a language with propositional
variables in V0 = {p1, . . . , pn}2), then for every a ∈ LV0( Lk), we also have that ρˆa ∈ LV0( Lk). In
other words we can consider ρˆ as a map ρˆ : LV0( Lk)→ LV0( Lk).
Definition 4.2. We call a map bˆ : (Sk)
X → [0, 1] a Kroupa belief function whenever there exists
a state sˆ : (Sk)
2X → [0, 1] such that for every a ∈M , bˆ(a) = sˆ(ρˆa).
The state sˆ needed in the definition of bˆ is called the state assignment in [26]. Although bˆ
has been directly introduced as a combination of ρˆ with the state assignment sˆ, a notion of mass
assignment can also be introduced even for this generalized case. Indeed, since X is finite, it turns
out that one can equivalently define
bˆ(a) =
∑
B⊆X
ρˆa(B) · sˆ(B).
In particular, since 1 = bˆ(X) =
∑
B⊆X sˆ(B), the restriction of the state sˆ to 2
X (call it mˆ) is
a classical mass assignment. Now, we are allowed to speak about focal elements of bˆ as those
elements in 2X that the mass assignment mˆ maps into a non-zero value.
Notice that, although the arguments in Kroupa’s definition of belief function are fuzzy sets, the
mass assignments that characterize each of these belief functions are defined on crisp (i.e. Boolean)
sets, and therefore, the focal elements associated to every Kroupa belief function are crisp sets. In
other words, every Kroupa belief function bˆ is defined from crisp, and not fuzzy, pieces of evidence.
Kroupa’s definition of belief function makes use (with the necessary modification in using a
state instead of a probability measure) of the maps ρˆa, for every a ∈M , which evaluate the degree
of inclusion ρˆa(B) of each classical (i.e. crisp, Boolean) subset B of X into the fuzzy set a. The
definition that we introduce below generalizes Kroupa’s definition by introducing, for every a ∈M ,
a map ρa assigning to every fuzzy set b ∈ M its degree of inclusion into a (cf. [1]). To be more
precise, let M = (Sk)
X , and consider, for every a ∈ M a map ρa : M → [0, 1] defined as follows:
for every b ∈M ,
ρa(b) = min{b(x)⇒ a(x) : x ∈ X} (5)
where ⇒ denotes the  Lukasiewicz implication function (x⇒ y = min(1, 1− x+ y)). 3
Remark 4.3. (1) In a sense, for every a ∈ M , ρa can be identified as the membership function
of the fuzzy set of elements of M (and hence the fuzzy subsets of X) that are included in a. In
particular one has ρa(b) = 1 whenever b ≤ a (for each point). Also notice that the Boolean skeleton
B(M) of any finite MV-algebra M = (Sk)
X coincides with 2X and hence, as also shown by the
following result, for every a ∈M the map ρa extends ρˆa in the domain.
(2) What we have already noticed in Remark 4.1 (2) with respect to ρˆ, can be similarly shown for
the map ρ : a ∈ LV0( Lk) 7→ ρa ∈ LV0( Lk).
2We remind the reader that, whenever we fix a language LC , a set of variables V , and a logic L together with
its consequence relation `L, the Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra LV (L) is the quotient algebra of formulas modulo the
equiprovability relation. We invite the reader to consult [5] for further details.
3Here the choice of ⇒ is due to the MV-algebraic setting, but other choices could be made in other algebraic
frameworks (see e.g. [1]).
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Proposition 4.4. (i) For all a, a′ ∈M , ρa∧a′ = min{ρa, ρa′}, and ρa∨a′ ≥ max{ρa, ρa′}.
(ii) For every a ∈M , the restriction of ρa to B(M) coincides with the transformation ρˆa defined
in equation (4).
(iii) For every A ∈ B(M), the restriction of ρA to B(M) coincides with the transformation βA
defined in equation (3).
Proof. (i) In every MV-chain, and in particular in the standard chain [0, 1]MV the equation ¬γ ⊕
(α∧β) = (¬γ⊕α)∧ (¬γ⊕β) holds:, i.e. (γ ⇒ (α∧β)) = (γ ⇒ α)∧ (γ ⇒ β). Therefore, for every
a, a′, b ∈M ,
ρa∧a′(b) = min{b(x)⇒ (a ∧ a′)(x) : x ∈ X}
= min{b(x)⇒ (a(x) ∧ a′(x)) : x ∈ X}
= min{(b(x)⇒ a(x)) ∧ (b(x)⇒ a′(x)) : x ∈ X}
= min{ρa(b), ρa′(b)}.
An easy computation shows that ρa∨a′ ≥ max{ρa, ρa′}.
(ii) For every B ∈ B(M), ρa(B) = min{B(x) ⇒ a(x) : x ∈ X}. Whenever x 6∈ B, B(x) = 0,
and hence B(x) ⇒ a(x) = 1 for all those x 6∈ B. On the other hand for all x ∈ B, B(x) = 1, and
so B(x)⇒ a(x) = 1⇒ a(x) = a(x) for all x ∈ B. Consequently, ρa(B) = min{a(x) : x ∈ B}.
(iii) It trivially follows from (ii) and Remark 4.1.
Now we introduce our definition of belief functions on MV-algebras of fuzzy sets.
Definition 4.5. Let X be finite, and let M = (Sk)
X be the finite MV-algebra of fuzzy sets of
X with values in Sk. A map b : M → [0, 1] is called a belief function if there exists a state
s : (Sk)
M → [0, 1] such that for every a ∈M ,
b(a) = s(ρa). (6)
We denote the class of all belief functions over M by Bel(M).
Notice that, as we already observed in Remark 4.3 (2), if a ∈M = (Sk)X then ρa ∈ (Sk)M and
hence s(ρa) is defined for every a ∈ (Sk)X .
It is clear from the definition that Bel(M) is a convex set, since states are closed by convex
combinations (recall Example 3.6).
Proposition 4.6. For every finite MV-algebra M , and for every b ∈ Bel(M), b is totally mono-
tone, i.e. b is monotone, and it satisfies: for all a1, . . . , an ∈M ,
b
(
n∨
i=1
ai
)
≥
∑
∅6=I⊆{1,...,n}
(−1)|I|+1 · b
(∧
k∈I
ak
)
.
Proof. Since for every a ∈ M , ρa is monotone, and every state s is monotone, b is monotone as
well. Moreover, for every n and for every a1, . . . , an ∈M , from (6) and Proposition 4.4 (i) we have
the following chain of inequalities:
b (
∨n
i=1 ai) = s(ρa1∨...∨an)
≥ s(ρa1 ∨ . . . ∨ ρan)
=
∑
∅6=I⊆{1,...,n}(−1)|I|+1 · s
(∧
k∈I ρak
)
=
∑
∅6=I⊆{1,...,n}(−1)|I|+1 · s
(
ρ(
∧
k∈I ak)
)
=
∑
∅6=I⊆{1,...,n}(−1)|I|+1 · b
(∧
k∈I ak
)
.
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On Boolean algebras, total monotonicity is a property that fully characterizes belief functions.
It is an open problem whether the same holds for belief functions on MV-algebras, even in our
restricted setting.
For every belief function b : M → [0, 1] defined by a state s on the finite MVk-algebra (Sk)M
we know from Theorem 3.7 that there exists a unique finitely additive probability measure P on
2M , the Boolean skeleton of (Sk)
M , such that, for every a ∈ (Sk)M
s(a) =
∑
f∈(Sk)X
a(f) · P ({f}). (7)
Let mb : (Sk)
X → [0, 1] be the probability distribution associated to the probability measure P of
(7), i.e. defined as mb(f) = P ({f}), for every f ∈ (Sk)X . In this case we get, for every f ∈M ,
b(a) = s(ρa) =
∑
f∈(Sk)X
ρa(f) ·mb(f). (8)
Then, for obvious reasons, we call mb the mass assignment associated to b.
Given a belief function b on M , in analogy with the classical case, an element f ∈ M is said
to be a focal element, provided that mb(f) > 0. Notice that the focal elements, are elements
of the MV-algebra M = (Sk)
X , and hence they are not crisp sets in general. This supports the
interpretation that the belief functions defined as in (6) differ from Kroupa definition by offering
a more general setting for evidence theory.
Let us denote by ⊥ the bottom element of M , i.e. the function ⊥ : X → Sk such that ⊥(x) = 0
for all x ∈ X. However, in general, ρ⊥ does not coincide with the bottom element of (Sk)M . In
fact, if a ∈ M is a function such that for no x ∈ X, f(x) = 1, then it immediately follows that
ρ⊥(f) > 0. Therefore, b(⊥) = 0 does not hold in general (and in particular, whenever s is a faithful
state). We call a belief function b on M normalized provided that all the focal elements of b are
normalized fuzzy sets, i.e. for every focal element f ∈ M for b there exists a x ∈ X such that
f(x) = 1.
For every r ∈ Sk, let r : X → Sk be the function constantly equal to r. Then for every
normalized fuzzy set f ∈M , ρr(f) = inf{f(x)⇒ r : x ∈ X} = r. Hence, if b is a normalized belief
function, b(r) =
∑
f∈(Sk)X ρr(f) ·m(f) = r. In other words the following holds.
Proposition 4.7. Let b ∈ Bel(M) be a normalized belief function. Then b is homogeneous, i.e.
for every r ∈ Sk, b(r) = r.
Example 4.8. Let us revisit Smets’ well-known story of the murder of Mrs. Jones [34]. There
are 3 suspects of being her murderer: Peter, Paul and Mary. Consider the information provided
by the janitor of the building where Mrs. Jones lives. He heard the victim yelling and saw a small
man running. It turns out that Paul and Mary are not tall while Peter is taller ((Paul is 1.65
m. tall, Mary is 1.60 m tall and Peter is 1.85 m.). So, actually, the subset of small suspects of
X = {Peter, Paul,Mary} can be considered as a fuzzy set, with membership function, say,
µsmall(Peter) = 0, µsmall(Paul) = 0.7, µsmall(Mary) = 0.9.
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On the other hand, Mary has short hair, so she may be mistaken as a man at first sight, and hence,
the subset of suspects looking like a man can be considered fuzzy as well, with membership function:
µman-like(Peter) = 1, µman-like(Paul) = 1, µman-like(Mary) = 0.5.
The evidence supplied by the janitor may be represented by a mass assignment m : [0, 1]X → [0, 1]
such that m(small ∧ man-like) = α > 0, m(X) = 1 − α and m(f) = 0 for any other f ∈ [0, 1]X .
Here we interpret ∧ by the min operator, so we have
µsmall∧man-like(Peter) = 0, µsmall∧man-like(Paul) = 0.7, µsmall∧man-like(Mary) = 0.5.
Suppose we are interested in computing the belief that the suspect is Paul. We then need to compute
ρ{Paul}(small ∧man-like) = min
x∈X
{µsmall∧man-like(x)⇒ µPaul(x)}
= min{0⇒ 0, 1⇒ 1, 0.5⇒ 0}
= min{1, 0.5} = 0.5
and ρ{Paul}(X) = 0. Finally, we have
b({Paul}) =
∑
f∈Supp(m)
ρ{Paul}(f) ·m({f})
= ρ{Paul}(small ∧man-like) ·m(small ∧man-like)
= 0.5 · α > 0.
Hence, we get a positive belief degree of Paul being the murderer. This is in contrast with the
results we would obtain with both the classical and Kroupa’s models, where focal elements are
only allowed to be classical subsets of X, in case we assume Mary can be mistaken as a man.
Indeed, in that case, we would be forced to take as focal element, besides X itself, the set small ∧
man-like = {Paul,Mary}, and since there would be no focal element included in {Paul}, we would
get b({Paul}) = 0.
One can analogously compute the belief of other (fuzzy) events of interest:
b(⊥) = 0.3 · α
b({Mary}) = 0.3 · α
b({Peter}) = 0.3 · α
b(small ∧man-like) = α
b(small) = α
b(man-like) = α+ 0.5 · (1− α)
b(X) = 1
Due to the fact that the focal element “small ∧man-like” is a non-normalized fuzzy set, the belief
of the of bottom element of b(⊥) is strictly positive.
5. An alternative definition of belief functions based on Dempster spaces
The definition of a belief function on a MV-algebra functions M = (Sk)
X we have proposed in
Definition 4.5 cannot be done by only working inside the MV-algebra M where the belief function
is defined. In fact the definition also involves a state on the bigger algebra (Sk)
M .
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A possibility to overcome this, so to say, peculiar situation is to resort to the original Dempster
model of defining a belief function as a lower probability induced by a multivalued mapping [8].
Indeed, given a probability µ on the power set of a finite set E and a multivalued mapping Γ : E →
2X , one can consider an induced lower probability on 2X defined as bel(A) = µ({v ∈ E | Γ(v) ⊆ A}),
for every A ⊆ X. This is in fact a belief function, and moreover, every belief function on X comes
defined in this way. The 4-tuple D = (W,E,Γ, µ) is called a Dempster space.
In this section we show how to define belief functions on MV-algebras of functions M = (Sk)
X
based on a natural generalization of Dempster spaces and we will show, as in the classical case,
that both approaches turn out to be equivalent. The approach based on generalized Dempster
spaces will have some advantages regarding the logical approach to belief functions developed in
Section 7.
Definition 5.1 (Generalized Dempster space). A generalized Demptser space is a 4-tuple
D = (W,E,Γ, µ) where
• W and E are non-empty sets
• µ : (Sk)E → [0, 1] is a state
• Γ : E → (Sk)W is a fuzzy set-valued mapping
For simplicity, generalized Dempster spaces will be simply called Dempster spaces from now
on.
For each f ∈ (Sk)W define %f : E → Sk by %f (v) = infw∈W Γ(v)(w)⇒ f(w).
Definition 5.2 (Belief function given by a Dempster space). Given a Dempster space
D = (W,E,Γ, µ), the induced belief function belD : (Sk)
W → [0, 1] is defined as
belD(f) = µ(%f ).
In order to distinguish the two notions of belief functions that we have introduced so far (namely
those from Definition 4.5 that we will denote by b, and the ones introduced above in Definition
5.2 that we will denote by belD), we will henceforth call Dempster belief funcions those induced by
a Dempster space as in Definition 5.2.
Lemma 5.3. For any Dempster space D = (W,E,Γ, µ), there is a mapping m : (Sk)
W → [0, 1]
such that ∑
g∈(Sk)W
m(g) = 1
and the Dempster belief function belD is defined as follows: for any f ∈ (Sk)W
belD(f) =
∑
g∈(Sk)W
ρf (g) ·m(g).
Proof. For any f ∈ (Sk)W , we have belD(f) = µ(%f ), where %f : E → Sk is defined by %f (v) =
infu∈W Γ(v)(u) ⇒ f(u) = ρf (Γ(v)). But µ(%f ) =
∑
v∈E %f (v) · µ({v}) =
∑
v∈E ρf (Γ(v)) · µ({v}).
Define now the mapping m : (Sk)
W → [0, 1] by
m(g) = µ({v ∈ E | Γ(v) = g}). (9)
Then it is clear that
∑
v∈E ρf (Γ(v)) · µ({v}) =
∑
g∈(Sk)W ρf (g) ·m(g).
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Finally, as it happens in the classical case, one can show that the two notions of belief functions
given in Definitions 4.5 and 5.2 are equivalent.
Proposition 5.4. Let W be finite. A mapping b : (Sk)
W → [0, 1] is a belief function in the sense
of Definition 4.5 iff there is a Dempster space D = (W,E,Γ, µ) such that b = belD.
Proof. Let b be a belief function defined by a state s : (Sk)
M → [0, 1] as in Definition 4.5. We
define the Dempster space D = (W,E,Γ, µ) where E = (Sk)
W , Γ : E → (Sk)W is the identity
function, and µ = s. Then we have
%f (g) = inf
g∈(Sk)W
Γ(g)(w)⇒ f(w) = inf
w
g(w)⇒ f(w) = ρf (g),
hence b(f) = s(ρf ) = µ(%f ) = belD(f).
Conversely, let belD be the belief function given by a Dempster space D = (W,E,Γ, µ) with
W finite. According to the preceeding lemma, there is a mass m on (Sk)
W such that belD(f) =∑
g∈(Sk)W ρf (g) ·m(g). Define the state s : (Sk)M → [0, 1] such that, for every h ∈ (Sk)M ,
s(h) =
∑
f∈M
h(f) ·m(f).
Then, the belief function on (Sk)
W defined by s does the job, since b(f) = s(ρf ) =
∑
g∈M ρf (g) ·
m(g) = belD(f).
6. The minimal modal extension of  Lck without nested modalities
In [17] the authors introduce a probabilistic fuzzy modal logic defined over the classical modal
logic S5 to axiomatize reasoning with classical belief functions. Roughly speaking, the intuition
behind that approach is that the two modalities P for probably, and the classical modality  of
S5, can be used to define a modality B by the combination P, which behaves as a belief function
over classical events. Although there are no particular requirements for choosing S5, this modal
logic has the advantage of being locally finite. This requirement is crucial to prove completeness
of the resulting probabilistic logic with respect to a Kripke style semantics.
As mentioned in the introduction, in this paper we introduce a similar approach for belief
functions on fuzzy sets of (Sk)
X and, following the definition we introduced in Section 4, we will
define a probabilistic logic over a suitable fuzzy modal logic Λk. In fact, in order to keep the
defined logic sufficiently expressive and locally finite, we will take Λk as the non-nested fragment
of Λ(Fr,  Lck), the minimal modal logic over the standard MVk-chain Sk defined and studied in [2].
We will devote this section to describe these modal logics and to show completeness of Λk.
The language of Λ(Fr,  Lck) is obtained by enlarging the language of  L
c
k by a unary modality
, and defining well formed formulas in the usual inductive manner: (1) every formula of  Lck is a
formula; (2) if ϕ and ψ are formulas, then ϕ, ϕ ψ, and ϕ→ ψ, are formulas.
A  Lck-Kripke frame is a tuple (W,R) where W is a non-empty set of possible worlds and
R : W ×W → Sk is an many-valued accessibility relation. We denote by Fr the class of all  Lck-
Kripke frames. A  Lck-Kripke model is a triple (W, e,R) where (W,R) is a  L
c
k-Kripke frame, and for
every possible world w, e(·, w) is a truth evaluation of  Lck-formulas into Sk.
Given a formula φ, and a  Lck-Kripke model K = (W, e,R), for every w ∈W , we define the truth
value of φ in w, ‖φ‖w, as follows:
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- If φ is a formula of  Lck, then ‖φ‖K,w = e(φ,w),
- If φ = ψ, then ‖ψ‖K,w =
∧
w′∈W
(
R(w,w′)⇒ ‖ψ‖K,w′
)
,
- If φ is a compound formula, its truth value is computed truth functionally by means of  Lck
truth functions.
The truth value of a formula φ in K is then defined as ‖φ‖K = inf{‖φ‖K,w | w ∈ W}. As usual,
the notion of (local) logical consequence in Fr is defined as follows: given a set of formulas Γ∪{ϕ},
ϕ follows from Γ, written Γ |=Fr ϕ, iff for every Kripke model K = (W, e,R) such that (W,R) ∈ Fr
and every w ∈W , if ‖ψ‖K,w = 1 for every ψ ∈ Γ, then ‖ϕ‖K,w = 1 as well.
The axioms of Λ(Fr,  Lck) are the following:
- All the axioms for  Lck
- (1) 1
- (2) (ϕ ∧ψ)→ (ϕ ∧ ψ)
- (3) (r → ϕ)↔ (r → ϕ), for each r ∈ Sk
The rules of Λ(Fr,  Lck) are Modus Ponens (from ϕ and ϕ → ψ infer ψ) and Monotonicity for 
(from ϕ→ ψ infer ϕ→ ψ).
The notion of proof in Λ(Fr,  Lck), denoted `Λ(Fr, Lck), is defined as usual from the above axioms
and rules. In [2] the authors show that Λ(Fr,  Lck) is sound and complete with respect to the class
Fr of  Lck-Kripke frames: for every set of formulas Γ ∪ {ϕ}, Γ |=Fr ϕ iff Γ `Λ(Fr, Lck) ϕ.
Remark 6.1. In [6] it is shown that the classical modal logic K is not locally finite. This means
that the Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra of K generated by any finite set of propositional variables is
infinite in general. In particular there is an infinite class of modal formulas φ1, φ2, . . . such that for
every i 6= j, φi ↔ φj is not valid in some Kripke frame. Since every Kripke frame for K belongs
to Fr as well, this means that Λ(Fr,  Lck) is not locally finite either.
Now we define Λk as the fragment of Λ(Fr,  L
c
k) obtained by restricting the language to formulas
without nested modalities. Namely, the set F(V ) of formulas of Λk is defined as follows:
(1) formulas of  Lck are formulas of Λk, i.e. F(V )
c ⊆ F(V );
(2) for every formula ϕ ∈ F(V ), ϕ ∈ F(V );
(3) F(V ) is taken closed under the connectives of  Lck.
Notice that, in this restricted case, nested modalities are not allowed, and hence, if for instance ϕ
and ψ are non-modal formulas, then (ϕ)  ψ is a formula of F(V ), but (ϕ  ψ) is not. In
particular notice that the above axioms (1)-(3) are formulas in F(V ).
The axioms of the logic Λk are those of Λ(Fr,  L
c
k), and its inference rules are Modus Ponens,
and the Monotonicity rule for , the latter being restricted in the premises to formulas in F(V )c.
We will denote by `Λk the provability relation in Λk.
Lemma 6.2. The logic Λk is locally finite.
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Proof. The claim can be easily proved recalling that  Lck is locally finite for every k, and then, fixing a
finite set of variables V0, there are, up to logical equivalence, only finitely many formulas in F(V0)
c,
i.e. the Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra LV0( L
c
k) is finite. Therefore the Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra
LV0(Λk) is finite as well, since its domain is contained in the finite set {[ϕ] : [ϕ] ∈ LV0( Lck)}.
Therefore Λk is locally finite.
Now we are going to show that Λk is sound and complete with respect to the class Fr of  L
c
k-
Kripke frames. This clearly shows that in fact Λ(Fr,  Lck) can be seen as a conservative expansion
of Λk.
The formulas in F(V ) can be translated into the language of  Lck as follows. For every atomic
modal formula ϕ, we expand the language with a fresh new variable qϕ, and let V q be this new
set of variables. Then we define the translation # from F(V ) to F(V ∪V q)c by stipulating: p# = p
if p ∈ V , (ϕ)# = qϕ, (r)# = r, (¬ϕ)# = ¬ϕ#, and (ϕ → ψ)# = ϕ# → ψ#. Moreover we define
the set K#(V ) to be the subset of all  Lck-formulas from F(V ∪V q)c obtained by translating all the
instances of the axioms of Λk plus the set of formulas of the form qϕ → qψ, for each ϕ→ ψ ∈ F(V )c
such that  Lck ` ϕ→ ψ.
Lemma 6.3. Let Γ ∪ ϕ be a subset of F(V ). Then Γ `Λk ϕ iff Γ# ∪K#(V ) ` Lck ϕ#.
Proof. This is semantically proved in [2, Theorem 3.26]. From a syntactic point of view, it is easy to
see that any proof Φ1, . . . ,Φl = ϕ of ϕ from Γ in Λk can be translated into a proof Φ
#
1 , . . . ,Φ
#
l′ = ϕ
#
of ϕ# from Γ# ∪K#(V ) in  Lck.
Theorem 6.4. The logic Λk is strongly complete with respect to the class Fr of  L
c
k-Kripke frames.
Proof. Let Γ ∪ {ϕ} be a set of formulas from F(V ), and assume that Γ 6`Λk ϕ. From Lemma 6.3,
Γ# ∪K#(V ) 6`Lk ϕ# and hence, from the strong real completeness of  Lck, there is a evaluation e of
V ∪ V q into Sk such that e(ψ) = 1 for every ψ ∈ Γ# ∪K#(V0), and e(ϕ#) < 1.
Then we define an  Lck-Kripke model K = (W, v,R) as follows:
• W is the set of all  Lck-evaluations w : V ∪ V q → Sk that are models of Γ# ∪K#(V ), and for
every ϕ ∈ F(V ) and every w ∈ W , define v(w,ϕ) = w(ϕ). Notice that e ∈ W , hence W is
not empty.
• For every w1, w2 ∈W , define R : W ×W → Sk by
R(w1, w2) = min{w2(ϕ) | ϕ ∈ F(V )c, w1(qϕ) = 1}. (10)
Clearly K is a  Lck-Kripke model and (W,R) ∈ Fr. Following the proof of [2, Lemma 4.8] we can
show by induction on the complexity of the considered formula that, for every ψ ∈ F(V0) and for
every w ∈ W , v(w,ψ) = ‖ψ‖K,w. Therefore, since the evaluation e belongs to W , we obtain that
‖ψ‖K,e = 1 for every ψ ∈ Γ# ∪K#(V ), and ‖ϕ‖K,e < 1. Consequently Γ 6|=Fr ϕ.
6.1. The case of  Lck-frames with crisp accessibility relations
In the same paper [2], the authors also study the subclass CFr of  Lck-Kripke frames (W,R)
where the accessibility relation R is crisp (two-valued). The corresponding logic, Λ(CFr,  Lck), is
shown to be axiomatizable by extending Λ(Fr,  Lck) with the well-known axiom K:
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(K) (ϕ→ ψ)→ (ϕ→ ψ).
In a similar way to what we have shown in the above section, one can consider the logic CΛk
defined as the nested modality-free fragment of Λ(CFr,  Lck). The same techniques used in the
above section show that CΛk is locally finite, and using [2, Lemma 4.20], one can also prove strong
completeness of CΛk with respect to the class CFr of crisp  L
c
k-Kripke frames.
6.2. The case of  Lck-frames with reflexive accessibility relations
Consider the logics Λrk and CΛ
r
k obtained by adding the axiom
(T ) ϕ→ ϕ
to Λk and CΛk respectively. We will show that these logics are also complete with respect to the
corresponding subclasses of  Lck-frames (W,R) where R is reflexive fuzzy relation, i.e. that for all
w ∈W , R(w,w) = 1 holds. This case is not considered in [2] so, for the sake of to be self contained,
we provide a simple proof.
Theorem 6.5. The logic Λrk (resp. CΛ
r
k) is sound and strongly complete with respect to the subclass
of  Lck-Kripke frames (W,R) from Fr (resp. CFr) where the relation R is reflexive.
Proof. In order to prove soundness we need to show that ϕ → ϕ holds true in every  Lck-Kripke
model K = (W, e,R) with R being reflexive. For every w ∈W , ‖ϕ→ ϕ‖K,w = 1 iff∧
w′∈W
R(w,w′)→ w′(ϕ) ≤ w(ϕ).
but we have that
∧
w′∈W R(w,w
′)→ w′(ϕ) ≤ R(w,w)→ w(ϕ) = 1→ w(ϕ) = w(ϕ).
The completeness proof is an adaptation of the proof of Theorem 6.4. Indeed, it is sufficient
to prove that, whenever K#(V ) contains the instances of the translations qϕ → ϕ of the axiom
T , the Kripke model K = (W, v,R) built in the proof of Theorem 6.4 is such that R is reflexive.
Indeed, from (10) it follows that for every w ∈ W , R(w,w) = min{w(ϕ) | ϕ ∈ F(V )c, w(qϕ) = 1}.
Now, since every w ∈W is a model of Γ# ∪K#(V ), in particular we have w(qϕ → ϕ) = 1, that is
w(qϕ) ≤ w(ϕ). Therefore w(ϕ) = 1 whenever w(qϕ) = 1, and hence it follows that R(w,w) = 1.
7. Logics for belief functions on fuzzy events
In this section we are going to introduce a probabilistic modal extension (cf. [14, 16, 20, 21])
of Λk (and its extensions CΛk, Λ
r
k and CΛ
r
k) that we will denote FP (Λk,  L
c) (FP (CΛk,  L
c),
FP (Λkk,  L
c), FP (CΛrk,  L
c) respectively), to deal with the two definitions of belief functions on
MV-algebras of fuzzy sets we discussed in Section 4, namely Kroupa belief functions and the new
equivalent definitions we have introduced there and in Section 5, together with their normalized
versions.
As already mentioned before, we extend to fuzzy events the fuzzy modal approach of [17] to
define a logic to reason about uncertainty on classical events modeled by belief functions. Namely,
the approach is based on:
• to consider fuzzy events modeled as propositions of (finitely-valued)  Lukasiewicz logic to-
gether with modality B, for belief, in such a way that, informally speaking, the truth degree
of Bϕ corresponds to the belief degree (in the sense of belief functions) of ϕ.
16
• to get a complete axiomatization of the modality B by relying on the fact that any belief
function on  Lukasiewicz formulas4 ϕ can be obtained as a probability (or state) on formulas
ϕ of the minimal modal extension of  Lukasiewicz logic Λk, and hence by defining Bϕ as the
combination of two other modalities Pϕ, where P is a probabilistic modality like in [14].
The language of the logic FP (Λk,  L
c) is obtained by expanding the language of Λk by a unary
modality P . The class F(V )P of formulas is defined as follows:
(i) F(V ) ⊆ F(V )P ;
(ii) for every ψ ∈ F(V ), Pψ is an atomic P -formula, for every rational number r ∈ [0, 1], r is
an atomic P -formula as well, and they belong to F(V )P ; and
(iii) F(V )P is obtained by closing the class of atomic P -formulas under the connectives of  Lukasiewicz
logic  L.
Formulas of F(V )P which are not from F(V ) (i.e. propositional combinations of formulas Pψ) will
be called P -formulas. For every ϕ ∈ F(V )c, we henceforth use the abbreviation B(ϕ) for P (ϕ).
These formulas will be formally introduced in the next section.
Notice that in FP (Λk,  L
c) we are allowing neither formulas that contain nested occurrences of
P nor compound formulas mixing formulas from F(V ) and F(V )P .
Axioms and rules of FP (Λk,  L
c) are as follows:
• Axioms and rules of Λk for formulas of F(V )
• Axioms and rules of  Lc for formulas in F(V )P
• The following probabilistic axioms for P -formulas (cf. [14]):
(PAX0) Pr ↔ r, for r ∈ Sk
(PAX1) P (¬ϕ)↔ ¬Pϕ
(PAX2) P (ϕ→ ψ)→ (Pϕ→ Pψ)
(PAX3) P (ϕ⊕ ψ)↔ [(Pϕ→ P (ψ  ϕ))→ Pψ]
• The rule of necessitation for P : from ϕ derive P (ϕ), for ϕ ∈ F(V )
In the above definition, we could consider adding to Λk the axioms (ϕ → ψ) → (ϕ → ψ)
and ϕ → ϕ (one or both) as we did in Sections 6.1 and 6.2. This would result in similar logics
FP (CΛk,  L
c), FP (Λrk,  L
c) and FP (CΛrk,  L
c).
Remark 7.1. It is worth noticing that both FP (Λk,  L
c) and FP (CΛk,  L
c) do not prove B(r)↔ r
for r ∈ Sk \ {0}. In fact, although P (r) ↔ r holds (it is an instance of the axiom (PAX0)),
Λk 6` r ↔ r, indeed Λk only proves one direction, r → r. Then, it is clear that the extension
Λrk, which contains the reflexivity axiom ϕ → ϕ, does prove the equivalence r ↔ r, and hence
both FP (Λrk,  L
c) and FP (CΛrk,  L
c) prove B(r)↔ r.
The first kind of semantics we introduce for FP (Λk,  L
c) and FP (CΛk,  L
c) is given by the classes
of probabilistic  Lck-Kripke models, and probabilistic crisp Kripke models respectively.
4According to the notions of belief functions introduced in Sections 4 and 5.
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Definition 7.2. A probabilistic  Lck-Kripke model is a system
M = (W, e,R, s)
such that (W, e,R) is a  Lck-Kripke model, and s : F

M → [0, 1] is a state on the MV-algebra of
functions FM = {fMϕ | ϕ ∈ F(V ), fMϕ : W → Sk,with fMϕ (w) = ‖ϕ‖M,w}.
If M is such that (W,R) is a classical Kripke frame, then M is called a probabilistic classical
 Lck-Kripke model.
Let M = (W, e,R, s) be a probabilistic (classical)  Lck-Kripke model. For every Φ ∈ F(V )P , and
for every w ∈W , we define the truth value of Φ in M at w inductively as follows:
• If Φ ∈ F(V ), then its truth value ‖Φ‖M,w is evaluated in (W, e,R) as defined in the previous
section.
• If Φ = Pψ, then ‖Pψ‖M,w = s(fMψ ).
• If Φ is a compound formula, its truth value is computed by truth functionality.
Theorem 7.3 (Probabilistic completeness). (1) The logic FP (Λk,  L
c) is sound and finitely strong
complete with respect to the class of probabilistic  Lck-Kripke models.
(2) The logic FP (CΛk,  L
c) is sound and finitely strong complete with respect to the class of
probabilistic classical  Lck-Kripke models.
Proof. The proof is an easy adaptation of the proof of [16, Theorem 25] reminding that both Λk
and CΛk are locally finite (Lemma 6.2), and that  L
c has the canonical FSRC (Theorem 3.4). In
order to keep the paper as self-contained as possible, we sketch the main steps of the proof.
Let Γ∪{Φ} be a finite subset of F(V )P , and assume that Γ 6` Φ. Consider the translation map
◦ from F(V )P to F(V )c that, similar to what we did in Section 6, works as follows:
• for every ψ ∈ F(V )c, ψ◦ = ψ and (ψ)◦ = (ψ)# = qψ,
• for every φ ∈ F(V ), (Pφ)◦ = uφ,
• for every Φ and Ψ in F(V )P , (Φ→ Ψ)◦ = Φ◦ → Ψ◦ and (¬Φ)◦ = ¬(Φ◦).
where the variables qy and ux are fresh for the language of  L
c
k. Since Λk is locally finite, letting
V0 be the finite set of variables appearing in Γ and Φ, we can choose finitely many representative
Ξ1, . . . ,Ξm, one for each equivalent class in LV0(Λk), and use them to instantiate the probabilistic
axioms (PAX1)-(PAX3). Therefore, if P denotes the finite set of formulas obtained instantiating
the axioms of (PAX1)-(PAX3) over Ξ1, . . . ,Ξm together with all the finitely many instances of the
axiom (PAX0), we define
FP ◦ = {Φ◦ : Φ ∈ P} ∪ {(Pφ)◦ : Λk ` φ}.
It is easy to show that, since Γ 6` Φ in FP (Λk,  Lc), then also Γ◦ ∪ FP ◦ ∪ K#(V0) 6` Φ◦ in  Lc.
Therefore, since Γ◦ ∪ FP ◦ ∪ K#(V0) is a finite theory in the language of  Lc, and since  Lc has
the canonical FSRC, from Theorem 3.4 (1) there exists a canonical evaluation e into [0, 1]MV that
satisfies Γ◦ ∪ FP ◦ ∪K#(V0), and e(Φ◦) < 1.
Following the proof of Theorem 6.4, and since the translation ◦ behaves as the translation #
we presented in Section 6 when restricted to formulas of F(V0)
, we can define W as the set of
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all  Lck-evaluations w from V0 ∪ {qψ : ψ ∈ F(V0)} ∪ {uφ◦ : P (φ) ∈ F(V0)P } that are models for
Γ◦ ∪ FP ◦ ∪K#(V0). The binary relation R is defined as in (10): for every w1, w2 ∈W ,
R(w1, w2) = min{w2(ϕ) : ϕ ∈ F(V0)c, w1(qϕ) = 1}.
Notice that, although the evaluations in W are defined on a wider class of propositional variables,
the evaluation of R only takes care of those variables that arise from the formulas in F(V0)
,
nevertheless it is easy to see that R is well defined. Hence M = (W, v,R) is a  Lck-Kripke model.
Finally, for every ‖ϕ‖M ∈ FM , let s(‖ϕ‖M ) = e(uϕ). The same proof of [16, Theorem 25] shows
that s is a state, and, consequently, N = (W, v,R, s) is a probabilistic  Lck-Kripke model that satisfies
Γ and does not satisfy Φ. This proves (1).
A similar proof can be easily adapted to the case of FP (CΛk,  L
c).
Now we can further consider the probabilistic logics FP (Λrk,  L
c) and FP (CΛrk,  L
c) built over
the modal logics Λrk and CΛ
r
k we have introduced in Section 6.2. Adapting the proof of the above
Theorem 7.3, it is fairly easy to see that these logics are sound and finitely strongly complete with
respect to the classes of probabilistic  Lck-Kripke models (W, e,R, s) in which R is a reflexive relation
and the class in which R is a crisp reflexive relation respectively. In the next section we will show
the importance of these logics to deal with normalized belief functions.
7.1. Belief function semantics for belief formulas
Now, we introduce a class of models that are more closely related to belief functions on MV-
algebras as we discussed in Section 4. As we have already observed in Proposition 4.4 (ii), Kroupa
belief functions are particular cases of those we introduced in Definition 4.5. We will then focus
on this latter generalization.
As for the formulas in F(V )P that well behave with respect to this semantics, let us consider
the following class.
Definition 7.4. The set of belief formulas (or B-formulas) is the subclass of F(V )P defined as
follows: atomic belief formulas are those of the form P (ψ) (where of course ψ is a formula in
 Lck), that will be henceforth denoted by B(ψ); compound belief formulas are defined from atomic
ones using the connectives of  Lc. The set of belief formulas will be denoted by F(V )B.
The class of models that we are about to introduce are based on belief functions rather than
states. The idea is to use an extension of Dempster spaces that allows to evaluate formulas of
F(V )c.
An evaluated Dempster space is a pair (D, e) where D is a Dempster space (Definition 5.1) and
e is a  Lck-evaluation.
Definition 7.5. Given an evaluated Dempster space (D, e), the induced belief function on formulas
of F(V )c is defined as
belD,e(ϕ) = belD(fϕ) (= µ(%fϕ))
where fϕ ∈ (Sk)W is the mapping defined by fϕ(w) = e(w,ϕ).
Definition 7.6 (Belief function on formulas). A mapping bel : F(V )c → [0, 1] is a belief
function on formulas if there is an evaluated Dempster-space (D, e) such that bel = belD,e.
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Consider a probabilistic  Lck-Kripke model K = (W,R, e, s), and define the evaluated Dempster
space (DK , e), where DK = (W,W,Γ, µ) where Γ : W → (Sk)W is defined as Γ(w) = R(w, ·),
and µ = s. Therefore, following Definition 7.5, we can say that every probabilistic Kripke model
induces (or defines) a belief function as follows:
Definition 7.7. Given K = (W,R, e, µ), the induced belief function on formulas of F(V )c is defined
as
belK(ϕ) = belDK ,e(ϕ).
Lemma 7.8. belK(ϕ) = µ(fϕ), where fϕ : W → Sk is defined as fϕ(w) = e(w,ϕ).
Proof. First observe that belDK ,e(ϕ) = belD(fϕ) = µ(%fϕ). Now let us compute µ(%fϕ), we have:
%fϕ : W → Sk is defined by
%fϕ(w) = inf
w′
Γ(w)(w′)⇒ fϕ(w′) = inf
w′
R(w,w′)⇒ e(w′, ϕ) = e(w,ϕ) = fϕ(w), (11)
i.e. %fϕ = fϕ.
Therefore, the truth evaluation of belief formulas given by each probabilistic  Lck-Kripke model
defines a belief function on non-modal formulas.
Remark 7.9. It is worth noticing that, whenever K = (W, e,R, s) is a probabilistic classical  Lck-
Kripke model (i.e. R is a crisp relation), for every w ∈ W , the mapping Γ(w) of DK maps
w′ ∈W 7→ R(w,w′) ∈ 2W , and hence %fϕ defined through (11) induces a belK in the sense of [26].
In fact, recalling the proof of Lemma 5.3, the mass associated to belK defined as in (9), provides
Boolean focal elements, since Γ(w) is a Boolean function.
The next theorem provides the converse direction, and hence both semantics are proved to be
equivalent for belief formulas.
Theorem 7.10. Every belief function on formulas (defined by an evaluated Dempster space) is
given by a probabilistic  Lck-Kripke model.
Proof. Let (D, e) be an evaluated Dempster space, where D = (W,E,Γ, µ) is Dempster space, and
let belD,e be its corresponding belief function defined as in Definition 7.5. We have to show that
there is a probabilistic  Lck-Kripke model K = (W
′, R, e′, µ′) such that, for each formula ϕ ∈ F(V )c,
belD,e(ϕ) = belK(ϕ).
By Lemma 5.3, we know there is mass function m : (Sk)
W → [0, 1] such that, for every
f ∈ (Sk)W , belD(f) =
∑
g∈(Sk)W ρf (g) ·m(g).
Define the probabilistic  Lck-Kripke model K = (W
′, R, e′, s) such that:
• W ′ = {(f, w) | f ∈ (Sk)W , w ∈W}
• for every (f, w), (g, w′) ∈W ′, R((f, w), (g, w′)) = f(w′)
• e′((f, w), ϕ) = e(w,ϕ), for each ϕ ∈ F(V )c
• s is a state on (Sk)W ′ such that for every f ∈ (Sk)W ,∑
w∈W
s({(f, w)}) = m(f).
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Observe that, if ψ is non-modal,
e′((f, w),ψ) =
∧
(g,w′)∈W ′ R((f, w), (g, w
′))⇒ e′((g, w′), ψ)
=
∧
(g,w′)∈W ′ f(w
′)⇒ e(w′, ψ)
=
∧
w′∈W f(w
′)⇒ fψ(w′)
= ρfψ(f).
Now consider a belief formula B(ψ) = P (ψ), and let us evaluate it in K = (W ′, e′, R, s):
belK(ψ) = ‖Pψ‖K = s(e′(·,ψ))
=
∑
(f,w)∈W ′ e
′((f, w),ψ) · s({(f, w)})
=
∑
(f,w)∈W ′ ρfψ(f) · s({(f, w)})
=
∑
f∈(Sk)W ρfψ(f) ·
(∑
w∈W s({(f, w)})
)
=
∑
f∈(Sk)W ρfψ(f) ·m(f)
= belD(fψ)
= belD,e(ψ).
Therefore, alternatively to the probabilistic  Lck-Kripke model semantics for belief formulas, we
can simply define a semantics based on belief functions on formulas. This is formally done in the
next two definitions.
Definition 7.11. Let Φ a belief formula and let bel a belief function on formulas of F(V )c. The
truth evaluation of Φ by bel is defined by induction as follows:
• if Φ is an atomic belief formulas Pϕ, then ‖Φ‖bel = bel(ϕ);
• ‖ · ‖bel is then extended to compound belief formulas using  Lck connectives.
If ‖Φ‖bel = 1 we say that bel is a model of Ψ. Moreover, we say bel is a model of a set of belief
formulas (belief theory) T if bel is a model of each formula of T .
Definition 7.12. Let T be a belief theory and let Φ be belief formula. T |=BF Φ iff for every belief
function bel on formulas of F(V )c, ‖Ψ‖bel = 1 for every Ψ ∈ T implies ‖Φ‖bel = 1 as well.
Analogously, one can define logical consequence relations |=BFKroupa , |=BFn and |=BFKroupa,n
corresponding to the classes of Kroupa belief functions, normalized belief functions and normalized
Kroupa belief functions, respectively.
Due to Theorem 7.10, T |=BF Φ can be equivalently given by probabilistic  Lck-Kripke models.
Lemma 7.13. T |=BF Φ iff for every probabilistic  Lck-Kripke model K = (W,R, e, µ), ‖Ψ‖K = 1
for every Ψ ∈ T implies ‖Φ‖K = 1 as well.
Finally we can formulate the following completeness result.
Theorem 7.14 (Completeness). Let T be a finite belief theory and let Φ be belief formula. Then
it holds that
T `FP (Λk, Lc) Φ iff T |=BF Φ,
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i.e. Φ is derivable from T in the logic FP (Λk,  L
c) if, and only if, every belief function on formulas
that is a model of T also is a model of Φ.
Proof. This is simply a direct consequence of the probabilistic completeness of FP (Λk,  L
c) (see
Theorem 7.3) and the above Lemma 7.13.
As a direct corollary we have the following completeness result for Kroupa belief functions.
Corollary 7.15. For any finite belief theory R and belief formula Φ be belief formula, it holds that
T `FP (CΛk, Lc) Φ iff T |=BFKroupa Φ.
7.2. Dealing with normalized belief functions
In Section 4 we called normalized those belief functions b : (Sk)
X → [0, 1] whose focal elements
are normalized fuzzy sets. A belief model (Ω,m) hence is said to be normalized provided that every
focal element f ∈ (Sk)Ω (i.e. every f ∈ (Sk)Ω such that m(f) > 0) is a normalized fuzzy set.
Consider a probabilistic  Lck-Kripke model K = (W, e,R, s) for FP (Λ
r
k,  L
c). In other words, let
K = (W, e,R, s) be a probabilistic  Lck-Kripke model, whose accessibility relation R is reflexive, and
define from K the evaluated Dempster space DK = (W,W,Γ, µ) defined as in the previous section.
Recall that Γ(w) = R(w, ·), and hence the mass assignment associated to belK defined as in (9)
induces focal elements g ∈ (Sk)W such that for some w′ ∈ W , g = Γ(w′) = R(w′, ·). Therefore, if
g = Γ(w′) is a focal element of belK , g(w′) = Γ(w′)(w′) = R(w′, w′) = 1, and hence g is normalized.
Proposition 7.16. For every probabilistic  Lck-Kripke model K = (W, e,R, s) with R reflexive,
there exists a normalized belief function on formulas bel such that, for every belief formula Φ,
‖Φ‖K = ‖Φ‖bel.
Conversely, let (D, e) = (W,E,Γ, µ, e) be an evaluated Dempster space inducing a normalized
belief function on formulas bel = belD,e, and let
• W ′ = {(f, w) : f is normalized, and f(w) = 1},
• R and e′(·) = ‖ · ‖(f,w) are defined as in the proof of Theorem 7.10,
• s is a state on (Sk)W ′ such that for every f ∈ (Sk)W ,∑
w∈W :f(w)=1
s({(f, w)}) = m(f),
where m is the mass associated to bel through Lemma 5.3.
Then M = (W ′, e′, R, s) is a probabilistic  Lck-Kripke model with R reflexive. In fact for every
(f, w) ∈ W ′, R((f, w), (f, w)) = f(w) = maxw′∈W f(w′) = 1 because f is a focal element for m,
and bel is normalized. Moreover, since for every w0 ∈W , the map g : W → Sk such that g(w) = 1
if w = w0, and g(w) = 0 otherwise is a normalized fuzzy subset of W , it follows that
W = {w ∈W : (g, w) ∈W ′}.
Therefore, taking this into account, if ψ is non-modal then, following the lines of the proof of
Theorem 7.10, we have ‖ψ‖(f,w) = ρ‖ψ‖(f). If Φ is any belief formula, then ‖Φ‖bel = ‖Φ‖M , in
other words the following holds.
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Proposition 7.17. For each normalized belief function on formulas bel there exists a probabilistic
 Lck-Kripke M = (W, e,R, s) with R reflexive, such that, for every belief formula Φ, ‖Φ‖M = ‖Φ‖bel.
Therefore from Proposition 7.16 and Proposition 7.17 we immediately get the following.
Theorem 7.18. The logic FP (Λrk,  L
c) is sound and finitely strong complete with respect to nor-
malized belief functions on formulas.
The following result, that we state in order to clarify what we discussed in Remark 7.1, is hence
a direct consequence of Theorem 7.18 and Proposition 4.7, showing that FP (Λrk,  L
c) proves that
the belief modality B is homogeneous.
Corollary 7.19. For every k ∈ N, and for every r ∈ Sk, FP (Λrk,  Lc) proves B(r)↔ r.
Corollary 7.20. For any finite belief theory R and belief formula Φ be belief formula, it holds that
T `FP (CΛrk, Lc) Φ iff T |=BFKroupa,n Φ.
8. Conclusion
In this paper we presented a logical approach to belief functions on MV-algebras. We have
followed the idea developed in [17] where the authors defined a logic for belief functions on Boolean
algebras by combining a probabilistic modality P with the classical S5 modality . Actually in
[17], the choice of S5 as the modal logic for events is motivated by the need of a locally finite logical
system (remember also our proof of Theorem 7.3, and the proof of [16, Theorem 25] where locally
finiteness is a crucial requirement for the logic of events), and in fact S5 is the weaker classical
modal logic that fulfills that requirement (see [6]). In this paper we started from a non-locally finite
modal logic as logic for events, and we recovered local finiteness by working on the syntactical level
of modal formulas, and specifically not allowing a nested use of . This remark shows that, in
fact, the same results the authors proved in [17] can be equivalently obtained considering, as logic
for events, a variant of the weaker classical modal logic K, without nested modalities. Indeed a
nested use of  is useless when we define belief formulas as we did in Section 7.1, and as they are
defined in [17, §4].
In our future work we plan to define an extension of the logics for belief functions over infinite-
valued events. In order to achieve this goal, we will follow the idea of considering a modal extension
of the infinitely-valued  Lukasiewicz calculus as logic for events. Indeed this problem is not trivial,
and although there are some papers that go in that direction (cf. [22, 23]), to adopt such kind of
formalisms to treat events would not keep the logic locally finite, even in the case of a language with
unnested modalities. This means that the same strategy we used in order to prove completeness
for our logics (Theorem 7.3) cannot be applied in this setting. On the other hand we might exploit
different kinds of completeness results like Pavelka-style completeness.
Not secondarily, we also plan to study the problem of establishing whether a partial assignment
on a countable set of fuzzy events, is extendible to a belief function defined over the algebra spanned
by them. This problem, which is related to the well known de Finetti coherence criterion for
probability measures, can be characterized in several ways. We will focus on the development of a
logico-algebraic and geometrical approach.
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